What the panel ordered
The Board granted reconsideration to correct the erroneous finding that applicant did not sustain a psychiatric injury AOE/COE but affirmed the WCJ's decision that applicant is not entitled to compensation for psychiatric injury under Labor Code section 3208.3(d) because he was employed less than six months and the injury was not caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.
Applicant sought reconsideration of the Finding and Order issued on July 2, 2025 by a WCJ, which denied compensability of psychiatric injury under Labor Code section 3208.3(d). The WCJ recommended denial of reconsideration. The Appeals Board granted reconsideration solely to correct a finding of fact but otherwise affirmed the WCJ's decision.
What was disputed, and how it came out
Each issue the panel decided, with the reasoning it gave. An outcome is what this panel did on this record — not a rule, and not a prediction.
The Board corrected the WCJ's erroneous finding that applicant did not sustain a psychiatric injury AOE/COE but affirmed that applicant was not employed for at least six months and the injury was not caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition, thus no compensation under section 3208.3(d).
From the decision · page 3The issue presented on reconsideration is whether applicant may be paid compensation for a psychiatric injury in this matter pursuant to section 3208.3(d), which provides in relevant part:
The facts that decided it
What the panel treated as outcome-determinative, and which side it favoured.
Applicant was employed less than six months by Nissan Automotive of Mission Hills, Inc.
Favours Defendant prevailed
Section 3208.3(d) prohibits compensation for psychiatric injury unless employed at least six months, absent a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.
From the decision · page 3injury but rather, states that "no compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six months. (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d), italics added.) Therefore, we grant reconsideration for the sole purpose of correcting the WCJ's erroneous finding that pursuant to 3208.3(d), applicant did not sustain a psychiatric injury AOE/COE. (F&O, Finding of Fact no. 3.) We otherwise affirm the WCJ's decision as we agree that defendant met its burden of proof to establish that applicant was not employed by Nissan Automotive of Mission Hills, Inc., (Nissan Mission Hills) "for at least six months." (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(d).)
Applicant was injured while performing a regular job duty of lifting automotive parts, which is not considered a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.
Favours Defendant prevailed
The injury did not meet the legal standard for sudden and extraordinary employment condition required to override the six-month employment requirement for psychiatric injury compensation.
From the decision · page 4It is uncontroverted that the injury occurred when the applicant was performing a function, i.e. lifting an engine that he himself testified was a part of his expected job duties. This activity, therefore, does not meet the Matea requirement that in order to qualify as an exception to the 6-month prohibition, the injury must occur as a result of a "sudden and extraordinary condition of employment". Applicant argues that he had never lifted a 900 lbs. engine before and that this was the first time. Therefore, this qualifies as "sudden and extraordinary". However, this WCJ finds that the case law would not support that conclusion on these facts.
What the panel did with the medical opinions
The role the physician served, and the weight the opinion carried. Physicians are named here as the decision names them; we do not score them.
Reported applicant's work duties delivering Nissan automotive parts, including that the heaviest item lifted alone was an alternator, and that the 900-pound engine was an unusual lift.
Provides factual background on applicant's work duties and lifting tasks relevant to the compensability issue under section 3208.3(d).
From the decision · page 8Reference is made to an April 2018 report Dr. Taylor issued. Starting on page 53 of that report, Dr. Taylor reported that applicant worked by himself full time Monday through Friday, from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., driving a pickup truck to deliver Nissan automotive parts to collision centers and repair shops throughout the greater Los Angeles area; applicant confirms that is accurate. Dr. Taylor went on to report that those parts would include engines, transmissions, bumpers, rims, tires, whatever the customer ordered; applicant confirms that is correct, but applicant is clarifying today that it was really just the one engine that he ever really had. Besides that engine, the heaviest item that he would have had to put in his truck was a fender. He never had to lift an alternator.
The rules the panel named
Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Labor Code section 3208.3(d)
Labor Code section 3208.3(d) prohibits compensation for psychiatric injury unless employed at least six months, except if caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition.
The Board applied this statute to determine compensability of psychiatric injury based on employment duration and nature of injury event.
From the decision · page 3The issue presented on reconsideration is whether applicant may be paid compensation for a psychiatric injury in this matter pursuant to section 3208.3(d), which provides in relevant part:
Matea v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
The burden of proof is on the applicant to show the injury was caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition to qualify for compensation under section 3208.3(d).
The Board referenced this case to explain the burden of proof and definition of sudden and extraordinary employment condition.
From the decision · page 9Applicant bears the burden of proof to establish the "sudden and extraordinary" exemption
What proof carried it
The evidence the panel weighed, by kind.
Applicant's unrebutted testimony that he was instructed to manually lift a 900-pound engine without mechanical assistance or safety spotters, which was unusual and unexpected.
From the decision · page 11I note that defendant attempted on cross-examination to impeach applicant's credibility by comparing prior testimony as to whether applicant had previously delivered engines for defendant employer. (See MOH/SOE, March 11, 2025, pp. 2-3.) However, the WCJ appears not to have found defendant's attempt effective as the WCJ made no adverse finding against applicant's credibility and did not address this limited cross-examination testimony in the Opinion on Decision or the Report. Regardless, and as set forth above, even if it were to be assumed arguendo that delivering engines was "regular and routine event" for delivery truck drivers at Nissan Mission Hills in the first six months of employment, the "extremely unusual circumstances" (see Garcia, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 774) that turned the injury producing incident of June 2, 2011 into a "sudden and extraordinary employment condition" under section 3208.3(d), has to do with applicant being instructed to manually lift that 900-pound engine into a small pickup truck without the mechanical assistance of the cherry picker or safety spotters, and further, was then expected to deliver that 900-pound engine in a small pickup truck by himself.
Defendant presented no evidence to rebut applicant's testimony that such lifting was not a routine or regular event.
From the decision · page 11Finally, and also as in Matea, defendant presented no evidence to rebut applicant's testimony, i.e., to establish that it was a "routine and regular employment event" within the first six months of their employment that delivery drivers would be instructed to manually load 900- pound engines into small pickup trucks without the mechanical assistance of a cherry picker, without safety spotters, and then to deliver those 900-pound engines alone. Under these circumstances,
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