What the panel ordered
Petitions for Reconsideration in Case Numbers ADJ16903801, ADJ16689751, ADJ16903295, ADJ16903722, ADJ16903753, ADJ16604010, and ADJ16903824 were denied; Petition for Reconsideration in ADJ17493829 was dismissed.p. 9
Defendant sought reconsideration of the Findings of Fact, Awards, Orders, and Opinion on Decision issued on July 15, 2026, which found seven applicants sustained compensable injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and an eighth applicant was not an employee on the date of injury.
What was disputed, and how it came out
Each issue the panel decided, with the reasoning it gave. An outcome is what this panel did on this record — not a rule, and not a prediction.
The evidence showed that the nature of the work required employees to furnish their own transportation during the workday due to shifting work locations, which fits the required vehicle exception to the going and coming rule, making the injury compensable.
From the decision · page 9Further, in Hinojosa, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the employee passengers were equally entitled to the required use exception outlined in Smith because all of the workers bear the burden and expense of providing the necessary vehicle for employment. (Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 162.) As a result, the commute differs from routine commute in that the manner in which the job was structured was dependent on use of vehicle to transport employees, as well as the essential trailer, throughout the workday. Because the job impliedly required use of a vehicle, the accident did arise out of and in the course of employment and is therefore compensable. Accordingly, we deny the Petitions for Reconsideration in Case Numbers ADJ16903801, ADJ16689751, ADJ16903295, ADJ16903722, ADJ16903753, ADJ16604010, ADJ16903824 and dismiss the Petition for Reconsideration in ADJ17493829.
The facts that decided it
What the panel treated as outcome-determinative, and which side it favoured.
The nature of the work required employees to furnish their own transportation during the workday due to shifting work locations and use of a van to move between blocks and ranches.
Favours Applicant prevailed
This fact fits the required vehicle exception to the going and coming rule, making the injury compensable.
From the decision · page 8(1968) 69 Cal.2d 814, which provides an exception to the going and coming bar where the employee is expressly or impliedly required or expected to furnish his own means of transportation to the job. (Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 160.) Here, just as in Hinojosa, the nature of the work made it necessary for the employee to furnish his own transportation during the workday because of the shifting of blocks and ranches. All applicants testified, and the employer did not rebut this testimony, that on any given day they did not know their assignments, that they would move from one block to another using the van either because of distance or because the trailer had to be towed, that the distance between the ranch and a worksite could be 30 to 40 minutes away, that travel between blocks was ten minutes by car, and that they all carried their primary tool, the straps, and equipment in the van. Thus, the requirement of a vehicle for all the workers was implied and the evidence supports the required use exception.
The rules the panel named
Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150; Price v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 559; Schultz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1126
Going and coming rule and its required vehicle exception as established in Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. and related cases.
The going and coming rule generally bars compensation for injuries during commute to a fixed place of business, but the required vehicle exception applies when the nature of the work requires employees to furnish their own transportation during the workday, making the injury compensable.
From the decision · page 8In Hinojosa and the opinions that followed it, the rule was established that the going and coming rule “provides that an injury suffered ‘during a local commute en route to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances is not within the course of employment.’” (Price v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 559, 564-565 [49 Cal.Comp.Cases 772] quoting Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157; Schultz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1128 [80 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) The facts here are consistent with the facts in the Hinojosa case down to the type of fruit being harvested. In Hinojosa, the applicant was also a farm laborer who was hired to thin and pick stone fruits. Upon completion at one ranch, the foreman would direct and assign the workers to a different ranch often during the same workday and for pay. From day to day, the workers would not know which ranch they were assigned to or for how long. Thus, furnishing one’s own transportation was required. Hinojosa did not have a car of his own, so he arranged to ride with a fellow worker and reimbursed him accordingly. On the way home from the ranch, he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The court relied on Smith v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.
What proof carried it
The evidence the panel weighed, by kind.
Testimony of applicants regarding use of van for transportation between work blocks and carrying of work equipment, unrebutted by employer.
From the decision · page 8(1968) 69 Cal.2d 814, which provides an exception to the going and coming bar where the employee is expressly or impliedly required or expected to furnish his own means of transportation to the job. (Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 160.) Here, just as in Hinojosa, the nature of the work made it necessary for the employee to furnish his own transportation during the workday because of the shifting of blocks and ranches. All applicants testified, and the employer did not rebut this testimony, that on any given day they did not know their assignments, that they would move from one block to another using the van either because of distance or because the trailer had to be towed, that the distance between the ranch and a worksite could be 30 to 40 minutes away, that travel between blocks was ten minutes by car, and that they all carried their primary tool, the straps, and equipment in the van. Thus, the requirement of a vehicle for all the workers was implied and the evidence supports the required use exception.
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About this page
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