Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Lab. Code, 3600(a)
An employer is liable for injury arising out of and in the course of employment under Labor Code section 3600(a).
The panel applied this standard to determine compensability of the injury.
From the decision · page 4Next, we address defendant's contention that the WCJ erred in finding that applicant
sustained industrial injury. Here we observe the fundamental principal that an employer is liable
in the workers' compensation system for an injury to an employee, "...arising out of and in the
course of the employment..." (Lab. Code, § 3600(a);1 Maher v. Workers' comp. Appeals Bd.
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 729, 732§ 733 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 326] (Maher).) The concept of "in the course
of the employment" generally, "...refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
injury occurs." (Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 733.) "Arising out of" employment generally refers to
the causal connection between the employment and the injury. (Id.) In other words, the employee
must be exposed to the "danger from which the injury results" as a result of his "particular
employment." (Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 734 n.3 (citing Industrial Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.
(1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 804, 809).)
Maher v. Workers' comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 729
The concept of 'in the course of employment' refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury; 'arising out of' refers to causal connection to employment.
The panel cited this case to explain the legal standard for injury causation.
From the decision · page 4Next, we address defendant's contention that the WCJ erred in finding that applicant
sustained industrial injury. Here we observe the fundamental principal that an employer is liable
in the workers' compensation system for an injury to an employee, "...arising out of and in the
course of the employment..." (Lab. Code, § 3600(a);1 Maher v. Workers' comp. Appeals Bd.
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 729, 732§ 733 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 326] (Maher).) The concept of "in the course
of the employment" generally, "...refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
injury occurs." (Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 733.) "Arising out of" employment generally refers to
the causal connection between the employment and the injury. (Id.) In other words, the employee
must be exposed to the "danger from which the injury results" as a result of his "particular
employment." (Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 734 n.3 (citing Industrial Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.
(1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 804, 809).)
South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291
Employment need only be a contributing cause of the injury; causation must be reasonably probable.
The panel applied this standard to assess causation probability.
From the decision · page 4The employment need only be a contributing cause of the injury. (South Coast Framing,
Inc., et al. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Board (Clark) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 297§ 299 [80
Cal.Comp.Cases 849]; Wickham v. North American Rockwell Corp. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 467, 473
[35 Cal.Comp.Cases 751] (citing Madin v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 90, 92§ 93).)
Moreover, "...industrial causation itself need not be certain, but only `reasonably probable.'"
(McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Board (1968) 69 Cal.2d 408, 417 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases
660] (McAllister).)
Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604
A medical opinion must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, not speculative, based on pertinent facts and adequate examination, with reasoning support.
The panel used this standard to evaluate the medical evidence's substantiality.
From the decision · page 62.)) We find no
inconsistencies between applicant's testimony and the injury described in applicant's medical
reports.
Defendant also argues that the reporting of Dr. Miles is not substantial evidence.
Defendant's argument fails to cite any evidence that Dr. Miles' report relies upon incorrect facts,
history, conjecture, or is otherwise defective. (Place v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals. Bd., supra, 35
Cal.Comp.Cases 525.)
To constitute substantial evidence "... a medical opinion must be framed in terms of
reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and
on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its
conclusions." (Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en
banc).)
On the record before us, we are persuaded that Dr. Miles' report constitutes substantial
medical evidence. Dr. Miles obtained a medical history from applicant, conducted a physical
examination, and received a detailed description of applicant's job duties. (Exhibit 1, pp. 2-5.)
Next, defendant argues that the reporting of Dr. Gray contains doubts regarding the
mechanism of injury. (Petition, 7:10-16.) Upon review of the record, we do not agree that Dr.