Athens Administrators

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this claims administrator is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

Where they appear

• Oakland 19
• Van Nuys 13
• Los Angeles 10
• San Francisco 6
• San Diego 5
• Anaheim 4
• Oxnard 4
• San Jose 4
• Santa Rosa 4
• Lodi 3
• Marina del Rey 3
• Stockton 3

How the appealed decisions came out

These are decisions that were appealed and published — the tail of a system that mostly settles. Most claims end in a compromise and release or a stipulation and never reach a panel, so nothing below describes how this claims administrator does its work. It describes how a set of appealed disputes came out.

• 41 for the defense
• 34 for the applicant
• 15 returned for more record

Counted over 85 appealed decisions. Not this claims administrator’s book of work. A decision that went one way on one issue and the other way on another is counted in both columns, so the figures add up to more than the total.

Decisions

Newest decisions this claims administrator is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

• ADJ17359397 · 2026-02-26 · Pomona District OfficeStatute of limitationsapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.8Further, under section 5403, an injured employee's "failure to give notice under section 5400, or any defect or inaccuracy in a notice is not a bar to recovery under this division if it is found as a fact in the proceedings for the collection of the claim that the employer was not in fact misled or prejudiced by such failure." Additionally, any "[l]imitations provisions in the [workers'] compensation law must be liberally construed in favor of the employee unless otherwise compelled by the language of the statute, and such enactments should not be interpreted in a manner which will result in a loss of compensation." (Blanchard v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 590, 595, 40 Cal. Comp. Cases 784, 787 (internal citations omitted).)

  Defendant failed to prove applicant's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because applicant timely filed a Claim Form on September 9, 2022, and reported the injury to her supervisor the day of or day after the injury, satisfying notice requirements.

  Official decision · page 8 →
• ADJ12812555 · 2026-02-11 · Santa Rosa District OfficePsyche AOE/COEremanded

  Determinative passage · p.2FACTS Applicant claims to have sustained a single cumulative injury to his psyche while working as a fire engineer. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), June 9, 2021, p. 2, lines 26-32.) Applicant was employed by Ukiah Valley Fire District ("District") from 2009 through December 16, 2017, and by City of Ukiah ("City") from December 17, 2017, through 2019. (Id. at p. 2, lines 42-44.) On November 15, 2017, the District and City entered into a transfer agreement where employees of the District would transfer to become employees of the City. (Joint Exhibit J2, Ukiah Valley Fire District and City of Ukiah Employee Transfer Agreement, November 15, 2017.) The agreement repeatedly refers to the employees of the District as "transferring employees." Applicant's rank did not change. (MOH/SOE, supra at p. 4, lines 26-27.) His job duties did not change. (Id. at p.

  The Board found that the applicant's employment was continuous between the two employers and that the injury was industrially caused, but deferred the determination of the date of injury and liability to the trial level for further proceedings.

  Official decision · page 2 →
• ADJ14778693 · 2025-10-29 · Oakland District OfficeQME/AME processremanded

  Determinative passage · p.6a. The length of delay caused by the QME's unavailability. b. The amount of prejudice caused by the delay in availability versus the amount of prejudice caused by restarting the QME process. c. What efforts, if any, have been made to remedy the QME's availability. d. Case specific factual reasons that justify replacing or keeping the current QME, including whether a party may have waived its objection. e. The Appeals Board's constitutional mandate to "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character." (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) (Vazquez, supra, at p. 527.) Defendant first requested the re-evaluation by Dr, Campos on August 22, 2023 (Ex. A), which was after the February 2, 2023 change in regulations. It did so again on September 21, 2023, and September 28, 2023, before QME Campos provided the appointment date of February 4, 2024, on September 28, 2023. (Exs. B, C, E.) The re-evaluation was scheduled over 120 days from the initial request in violation of AD Rules 31.3(e) and 31.5(a)(2). Thus, the WCJ should consider whether there was good cause pursuant to Vazquez to replace the QME due to unavailability. Therefore, we rescind the F&O and return this matter to the WCJ for consideration of whether good exists to order a replacement QME panel.

  The Appeals Board found that the re-evaluation was scheduled over 120 days from the initial request, in violation of AD Rules 31.3(e) and 31.5(a)(2), and remanded for the WCJ to consider whether good cause exists to replace the QME due to unavailability, as required by Vazquez.

  Official decision · page 6 →
• ADJ18157692 · 2025-10-22 · Los Angeles District OfficeQME/AME processremanded

  Determinative passage · p.2record or explaining the need for further development of the record and thus, the order violates the

  The WCJ took the matter off calendar without creating a record or explaining the need for further development, violating due process and constituting irreparable harm; removal is proper and the matter is returned to trial level to create a record.

  Official decision · page 2 →
• ADJ10908652 · 2025-09-16 · Los Angeles District OfficePsyche AOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of the "Joint Findings and Award and Opinion on Decision" (F&A) issued on June 4, 2025, by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The WCJ found, in pertinent part, that applicant did not sustain industrial injury to her psyche during the cumulative period ending on May 25, 2017. The WCJ further found that applicant sustained industrial injury to the psyche in her specific injury case but barred any permanent disability from such injury pursuant to Labor Code1 section 4660.1.

  The WCAB found that the WCJ erred in denying compensability of psychiatric cumulative injury and permanent disability. The medical record showed industrial injury to psyche on a cumulative basis and the QME's intertwined disability opinion required further development. The matter was returned for further proceedings.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ16251404 · 2025-09-05 · Anaheim District OfficeMedical treatment / UR / IMRdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5The dispute here is whether the WCJ erred in finding applicant was not required to answer psychologically related questions. For the reasons detailed below, we conclude that in this case, the WCJ did not err because an allegation of headaches does not constitute a waiver of medical privacy regarding psychiatric care history.

  The WCJ did not err because the applicant did not plead a psychiatric injury and thus did not waive her right to privacy regarding psychiatric history; defendant failed to show significant prejudice or irreparable harm to justify removal; discovery related to headaches may proceed separately.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ13057590 · 2025-08-25 · Van Nuys District OfficeSJDB voucherdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of the June 12, 2025 Findings of Fact and Orders (F&O) issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). By the F&O, as relevant here, the WCJ found defendant produced proof of service for a supplemental job displacement voucher (SJDV), and under Evidence Code section 641, it is presumed that the defendant timely mailed the SJDV and the SJDV was received, and defendant acted reasonably and timely in replacing the voucher upon notice of actual non-receipt. The WCJ also found that though the voucher was not in fact received by applicant, applicant failed in their burden of proof to rebut the presumption and was not entitled to a penalty.

  The Appeals Board found that defendant produced proof of service for the voucher, invoking the presumption under Evidence Code section 641 that the voucher was mailed and received. Applicant failed to produce believable contrary evidence to rebut this presumption. The WCJ and Appeals Board found no unreasonable delay warranting penalties or attorney fees.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ18593806 · 2025-08-25 · Oxnard District OfficePsyche AOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.6Here, the plain language of section 3212.15 compels a finding that applicant has sustained a presumptively compensable injury. There is no dispute that applicant is among the classes of employees for whom the presumption of section 3212.15 is available, or that the PTSD arose or manifested during applicant's employment. (Lab. Code § 3212.15, subd. (b), (c).) The medical record establishes a diagnosis of PTSD. (Dr. Egan's QME Report; Dr. Isaac's PTP report, dated January 2, 2024.) Applicant has thus met the burden of proof necessary for the presumption of industrial causation to attach, and the burden of proof now shifts to the defendant to affirmatively controvert the presumption, or we are "bound to find in accordance with [the presumption]." (Lab. Code § 3212.15(c)(2).)

  Applicant met the presumption under Labor Code section 3212.15, and defendant failed to rebut it with substantial evidence, so the injury to psyche in the form of PTSD is compensable.

  Official decision · page 6 →
• ADJ9468922 · 2025-08-11 · Lodi District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.4For the reasons stated in the Report and Opinion on Decision, we agree with the WCJ that applicant met his prima facia burden to prove that the presumption pursuant to section 3212.1 applies based on the preponderance of the evidence (Lab. Code, § 3202.5, 5705), i.e., that he was a firefighter, that he was exposed to a known carcinogen, and that he developed prostate cancer. We note that panel qualified medical evaluator (PQME) Thomas Allems, M.D., stated that it was indisputable that firefighters are exposed to carcinogens in smoke and post-fire gasses (Report of Dr. Allems, 1/17/15, at pp. 6-7, Exhibit B) and that there is "limited evidence" of association between cadmium and arsenic with prostate cancer (id. at p. 4, emphasis in original). We also note

  The WCAB found that the applicant met the presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 3212.1 for prostate cancer as a firefighter and that the defense PQME's contrary opinion was not substantial evidence due to incorrect legal theory and internal inconsistencies.

  Official decision · page 4 →
• ADJ19616091 · 2025-08-11 · Santa Rosa District OfficeJurisdiction / venueapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.4*** [T]he issue in a nutshell is whether a party may request a compensability evaluation when the request is made contemporaneously with the filing of the claim form. Labor Code § 4060 indicates, in relevant part: "If a medical evaluation is required to determine compensability at any time after the filing of the claim form, and the employee is represented by an attorney, a medical evaluation to determine compensability shall be obtained only by the procedure provided in Section 4062.2." (Labor Code § 4060(c))(emphasis added). The court reads this as preluding the simultaneous filing of a claim form and request for a compensability evaluation.

  The Appeals Board found that the WCJ's conclusion that the request for a medical evaluation and the filing of the claim could not be simultaneous was not based on the clear language of Labor Code section 4060(c).

  Official decision · page 4 →
• ADJ19555636 · 2025-06-24 · San Diego District OfficePsyche AOE/COEdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order and Award (F&O), issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) on April 9, 2025, wherein the WCJ found in pertinent part that applicant did not sustain injury arising out of and in the course of employment to her psyche while employed during the period November 7, 2023, through January 26, 2024, as an Occupational Therapy Assistant. The WCJ ordered that applicant take nothing.

  The WCJ found no objective evidence of harassment or bullying constituting actual events of employment causing the psychiatric injury. The WCJ's credibility determinations were given great weight and not disturbed. The Appeals Board adopted the WCJ's findings and denied the petition.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ16130330 · 2025-04-11 · Van Nuys District OfficeStatute of limitationsdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3II. Defendant contends that the evidence establishes that applicant's section 5412 date of injury is April 21, 2016, or, alternatively, a date before June 19, 2019. Specifically, defendant argues that (1) the medical record shows that applicant had orthopedic complaints to her neck, back, and shoulders in 2016 that she believed were work- related; and (2) applicant was effectively disabled from work as a result of these orthopedic injuries as shown by an April 21, 2016 chiropractic finding that she had a limited range of motion of the spine, and a February 9, 2017 MRI finding evidencing that she had sustained disability. (Petition, pp. 5:12-7:2.) Under section 5412, "[t]he date of injury in cases of occupational diseases or cumulative injuries is that date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was caused by his present or prior employment." (Lab. Code, § 5412.) Whether an employee knew or should have known his disability was industrially caused is a question of fact. (City of Fresno v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Johnson) (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 467, 471 [50 Cal.Comp.Cases 53] (Johnson); Nielsen v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

  Defendant failed to prove applicant knew or should have known of disability caused by employment before May 24, 2022, and no medical evidence showed disability before that date; applicant's suspicion alone insufficient to establish earlier date.

  Official decision · page 3 →

Also recorded as

The same claims administrator is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. This is every spelling behind the figures above.

• ATHENS ADMINISTRATORS
• Athens Administrators
• ATHENS
• Athens Administrators Concord
• ATHENS ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
• ATHENS ADMINISTRATORS CONCORD
• ATHENS ADMINISTRATORS ORANGE
• Athens Administrators Orange
• ATHENS ADMINISTRATOR

Is this your company and something here is wrong? Tell us and we will fix it. Every figure on this page is a count of released decisions this claims administrator is named in, and the decisions themselves are listed above with the passage each turned on.